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Summary findings
Critics of free trade have raised the specter of a "race to  suspended particulate matter-has  actually declined in
the bottom," in which environmental standards collapse  major cities in all four countries during the era of
because polluters threaten  to relocate to "pollution  globalization.
havens" in the developing world. Proponents of this view  Citing recent research, Wheeler argues that the race-
advocate high, globally uniform standards enforced by  to-the-bottom  model is flawed because its basic
punitive trade measures that neutralize the cost  assumptions misrepresent the political economy of
advantage of would-be pollution havens.  pollution  control in developing countries.
To test the race-to-the-bottom model, Wheeler  He proposes a more realistic model, in which low-
analyzes recent air quality trends in the United States and  income societies serve their own long-run interests by
in Brazil, China, and Mexico, the three largest recipients  reducing pollution. He concludes with recommendations
of foreign investment in the developing world.  for international assistance measures that can improve
The evidence clearly contradicts the model's central  environmental quality without counterproductive
prediction. The most dangerous form of air pollution-  enforcement of uniform standards and trade sanctions.
This paper-a  product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the
group to study the economics of pollution control in developing countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact David Wheeler, room MC2-529, telephone 202-
473-3401, fax 202-522-3230,  email address dwheelerl @worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted
on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers. January 2001.  (24 pages)
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countries they represent.
Produced  by the Policy Research  Dissemination  CenterRacing to the Bottom?





* The author is Lead Economist  in the Infrastructure/Environment Team of the
Development  Research Group. Many thanks to Ashoka  Mody for useful comments
on a previous  draft of this paper.Racing to the Bottom?
Foreign Investment and Air Pollution in Developing Countries
1.  Introduction
Could globalization trigger an environmental "race  to the bottom," in which
competition for investment and jobs relentlessly  degrades environmental standards?
Since billions of people subsist on less than two dollars a day, it would be cavalier to
dismiss this threat lightly. Indeed, the race-to-the-bottom  model provokes widespread
concern because its underlying assumptions have an air of plausibility.  1 In the race-to-
the-bottom  world, decent environmental  standards impose high costs on polluters in high-
income economies. To remain competitive,  these firms relocate to low-income countries
whose people are desperate for jobs and income. Local goverrnents  ignore regulation to
promote investment and economic growth, allowing businesses to minimize costs by
polluting with impunity. Driven by shareholders  to maximize profits, international firms
follow suit.  Rising capital outflows force govermnents  in high-income countries to begin
'  Daly (2000) has recently provided a forceful statement of the race-to-the-bottom  model. In the US,
political opponents of NAFTA and the WTO frequently invoke elements of the model. For example,
Congressman David Bonior has recently offered the following  critique of the WTO:  "....  many of the
world's political and economic leaders have adopted our ways of discussing  the global economy.  They're
warning against 'a race to the bottom.' They calling for 'putting a human face on the global economy.' And
they say they're supporting labor and environmental  standards in trade agreements .... Make no mistake
about what is at stake in the deliberations  and decisions of the WTO....  The WTO, as currently structured,
threatens to undo internationally everything  we have achieved  nationally -every environmental  protection,
every consumer safeguard, every labor victory." (Bonior, 1999)
In a similar vein, the Nader-for-President  campaign has offered this statement on Trade and
Environment at its Website (http://www.votenader.com/issues/environment.html):  "Among the most fetid
examples of political cowardice and collusion between elected representatives and big business of the past
thirty-five years are the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the revised
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into federal law. These agreements have little to do with
the benefits of trade for citizens of member countries. The agreements  were designed, largely by corporate
lobbyists, as a "pull-down" mechanism  and to facilitate the movement of capital across national boundaries.
Such one-dimensional  monetized logic tramples long-standing  efforts around the world-some very
successful-to protect the environment  because environmental safeguards  are very often considered 'non-
tariff barriers to trade' and thus become targets for removal. Five years of WTO operation  have made clear
what a grave threat the trade organization  is to the world environment."
Irelaxing environmental standards, but this proves fruitless because the poorest countries
have no environmental standards at all. As the ensuing "race to the bottom" accelerates,
all countries converge to the hellish pollution levels that afflict the poorest.
Proponents  of this catastrophe  model have a straightforward  preventive
recommendation:  High, globally-uniform  environmental standards and, for countries that
are unwilling or unable to enforce them, tariffs or other restrictions on imports of their
pollution-intensive  products that neutralize their cost advantage as pollution havens.
Proponents of free trade naturally view these prescriptions as anathema, arguing that their
main impact would be denial of jobs and income to the world's poorest people.
2.  A Simple Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom  Model
If the race-to-the-bottom  model is correct, then globalization will ultimately provoke
a strong backlash in high-income countries as business relocation threatens  jobs, wages
and environmental standards. Fortunately, the potential for this reversal is easy to gauge
because the simple structure of the race-to-the-bottom  model yields an equally simple,
robust prediction: After decades of increasing capital mobility and economic
liberalization, the race to the bottom should be underway and pollution should be
increasing everywhere. It should be rising in poor countries because they are pollution
havens, and in high-income  economies because they are relaxing standards to remain
cost-competitive. Trends in available pollution data provide a reasonable basis for testing
these propositions.
Climatic and economic factors cause pollution to vary considerably from year to
year, so trend analysis requires an extended series of monitoring data.  For comparison of
environmental conditions in large urban regions, air pollution measures are generally
2more reliable and comparable than water pollution data. Among widely-measured  air
pollutants, the international  health community currently believes the most damaging to be
suspended particulate matter (dust). Numerous health studies in low- and high-income
countries have associated high concentrations of suspended particulates with higher-than-
normal rates of death and illness from cardio-pulmonary  problems. Over time, health
research has narrowed its focus from all suspended particulate matter (SPM) to particles
less than 10 microns in diameter (PM- 10) and, most recently, to particles whose
diameters are less than 2.5 microns (PM-2.5). Atmospheric monitoring is adjusting to
these findings, but PM-2.5 readings remain scarce in low-income countries. Since all
particulate concentration measures are correlated, however, even SPM measures provide
useful information about pollution that severely damages human health.
Air quality monitoring is routine in high-income  countries, but it remains uneven in
the developing world. China, Mexico and Brazil provide notable exceptions. During the
past two decades, these three rapidly-industrializing  countries have begun monitoring and
reporting SPM, PM-10, and other forms of air pollution in a number of industrial centers.
In addition, they have had the top three shares of foreign direct investment among
developing countries throughout the 1990's. China's average share has been 28%, while
the averages for Mexico and Brazil have been 9% and 7%, respectively. As Figure 1
shows, their combined FDI was nearly 60% of the total for developing countries in 1998.
If the race-to-the-bottom  model is correct, then urban SPM and PM-l0 levels should be
rising in all three countries. In the United States, race-to-the-bottom  proponents have
been particularly vocal about more liberal trade agreements  with Mexico and China. It
3would seem reasonable to trace this concern to deteriorating air quality in US cities, since
US industrial imports from all three countries have been expanding for decades.
To test the race-to-the-bottom  prediction, Figures 2-4 present SPM and PM-10
monitoring data along with foreign direct investment statistics for China, Mexico and Sao
Paulo State, which is Brazil's dominant industrial region. For comparison, Figure 5
displays PM-i 0 monitoring data from five US metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Houston,
Chicago, Atlanta and New York). The Chinese series is the average annual SPM reading
for over 50 cities, reflecting the extensive coverage of China's air monitoring network.
The Mexican data reflect SPM readings in Mexico City, while the Brazilian series are
drawn from PM- 1O  measures for the industrial region of Cubatao in Sao Paulo State.
Mexico City is by far the largest industrial center in Mexico and Cubatao has traditionally
been a center for pollution-intensive  industry in Sao Paulo. 2 These two regions, along
with Los Angeles, suffer from geographic and climatic conditions that make them natural
"traps" for air pollution.
The foreign investment data in Figures 1-4  provide a compelling picture of
expansion in China, Mexico and Brazil during the past two decades. However, Figures
2-5 show no sign of a race to the bottom; trends in particulate pollution are downward in
all four countries. Despite China's poverty and rapid industrialization, its major urban
areas have experienced a significant decline in SPM. During the period 1987 - 1995,  the
average concentration fell from nearly 500 micrograms per cubic meter (ug/m 3) to
somewhat over 300. After rising in the early 1990's, Mexico City's percentage of SPM
2  Data sources: US: USEPA online at http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd97/tables.html;  Brazil: Pollution
Control Agency of Sao Paulo State (CETESB, 1996, 1990, 1994) and CETESB online at
http://www.cetesb.br; China:  China Environmental  Monitoring  Center  and Wheeler  (1999); Mexico: National
Environment  Ministry online at http:H/www.ine.gob.mx/dggia/cal_aire/libros/segu_info/mexico.html
4readings above standards fell to historical lows in the latter part of the decade (the period
during which NAFTA was implemented). In Cubatao, Brazil, the average PM-10
concentration  fell from 180 ug/m 3 in 1984 to around 80 in 1998.3 In the United States,
all five metropolitan areas had declining PM-1O  concentrations during the period 1988-
1997. The sharpest reduction -- 32% -- was recorded in Los Angeles, the largest US
urban-industrial  area in the region most affected by NAFTA.
These results strongly contradict the race-to-the-bottom  model. Instead of racing
toward the bottom, major urban areas in China, Brazil, Mexico and the US have all
experienced significant  improvements in air quality. The improvements in Los Angeles
and Mexico City are particularly noteworthy, since they are the dominant industrial
centers in the region most strongly affected by NAFTA.
3.  Problems  with the Race-to-the-Bottom  Model
The race-to-the-bottom  model's basic assumptions must be flawed, since its
predictions are inconsistent with urban air pollution trends in three of the developing
world's major industrial powers. In fact, empirical research has undermined all of these
assumptions.
1. Pollution control is not a critical cost factor for most private firms. Research in
both high- and low-income countries suggests that pollution control does not impose high
costs on business firns.  Jaffe (1995) and others have shown that compliance costs for
OECD industries are surprisingly small, despite the use of command-and-control
regulations that are economically  inefficient. These results suggest that differential
3 Comparable PM-10 series for the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area are not available. However, air quality
reports from CETESB, Sao Paulo State's Environmental Agency, show that average SPM levels in Sao
Paulo fell by 52% during the period 1980 - 1995.
5pollution control costs do not provide OECD firms with strong incentives to move
offshore. Firms in developing countries frequently have even lower costs, because the
labor and materials used for pollution control are less costly than in the OECD
economies. Big polluters also have lower average control costs per unit of pollution
because abatement is subject to scale economies. Figure 6 displays recent econometric
estimates of control costs for sulfur dioxide air pollution in large Chinese factories
(Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler, 1997).4 For non-state-owned  enterprises, costs of a few
dollars per ton are typical until control rates rise above 70%. As Figure 6 shows, state-
owned enterprises have much higher costs because they are operated less efficiently. The
average cost of pollution control has therefore declined as China has moved away from
state ownership during the era of liberalization. In Colombia, a new pollution charge
program  has sharply reduced organic water pollution by large factories. Colombian
factory managers have found that cleaning  up is cheaper than paying charges, even when
they are set at relatively low levels. No participating factory seems to have experienced
financial difficulties in the process (Wheeler, 1999). Similar conclusions have emerged
from studies of  regulation and control costs in Malaysia (Jha, Markandya and Vossenaar,
1999; Khalid and Braden, 1993).
2.  Low-income communities  penalize dangerous polluters, even when formal
regulation is weak or absent. Abundant evidence from Asia and Latin America shows
that neighboring communities can strongly influence factories' environmental
4  Xu, et.  al.  (1994)  have  shown  that  atmospheric  sulfur  dioxide  (SO2) concentrations  are  highly  correlated
with damage from respiratory disease in China.  Sulfur dioxide and other oxides of sulfur combine with
oxygen to form sulfates, and with water vapor to form aerosols of sulfurous and sulfuric acid.  Much of the
health damage from SO 2 seems to come from fine particulates (PM-2.5) in the form of sulfates.
6performance. 5 Where formal regulators are present, communities use the political process
to influence  the strictness  of enforcement. Where regulators are absent or ineffective,
NGOs and community groups -- including religious institutions, social organizations,
citizens' movements, and politicians -- pursue informal regulation based on convincing
polluters to conform to social norms. Although these groups vary from region to region,
the pattern everywhere is similar: Factories negotiate directly with local actors in
response to threats of social, political or physical sanctions if they fail to compensate the
community or reduce emissions.
Indeed, communities sometimes resort to extreme measures when sufficiently
provoked. In the Asian Survey, Robert Cribb has recounted an Indonesian incident
"reported from Banjaran near Jakarta in 1980 when local farmers burned a government-
owned chemical factory that had been polluting their irrigation channels."  In a similar
vein, Mark Clifford has reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review that community
action prevented the opening of a chemical complex in Korea until appropriate pollution
control equipment was installed.
When factories respond directly  to communities, the results may bear little
resemblance  to the dictates of formal regulation. For example, Cribb also cites the case
of a cement factory in Jakarta that -- without admitting liability for the dust it generates --
"compensates local people with an ex gratia payment of Rp. 5,000 and a tin of evaporated
milk every month."  In India, Anil Agarwal, et al. (1982) describe a situation where,
confronted by community complaints,  an Indian paper mill installed pollution abatement
equipment -- and, to compensate  residents for remaining damage, the mill also
5  See Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Hettige, Huq, Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Huq and Wheeler (1992),
Hartman, Huq and Wheeler (1997), and Dasgupta, Lucas and Wheeler (1998).
7constructed a Hindu temple. If all else fails, community  action can also trigger physical
removal of the problem. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, a neighborhood association
protest against a polluting tannery led managers to relocate it to the city's outskirts (Stotz,
1991).
3.  Rising income strengthens  regulation. Countries  regulate pollution more strictly
as they get wealthier for three main reasons. First, pollution damage gets higher priority
after rising wealth has financed basic investments in health and education. Second,
higher-income societies have stronger regulatory institutions because technical personnel
are more plentiful and budgets for monitoring and enforcement activities are more
generous. Third, higher income and education empower local communities to enforce
higher environmental standards, whatever stance is taken by the national government
(Dasgupta and Wheeler, 1996; Pargal and Wheeler, 1996). The result is a very close
relationship  between national pollution regulation and income per capita, as illustrated by
Figure 7.
4.  Local businesses control pollution because abatement reduces costs. Although
public spirit moves a notable minority of firms to control pollution, most managers are
bound by pressures from markets and shareholders. Through a variety of channels,
regulatory and market forces induce managers to reduce costs by controlling pollution.
Where formal regulation is well-developed,  financial penalties for excessive pollution
can include charges, fines and revenue losses from plant closures.  Where formal
regulation is not present, local communities can exact penalties through political, social
and economic channels. Market agents can also play an important role. Bankers may
refuse to extend credit because they are worried about liability; consumers may avoid the
8products of firms that are known to be heavy polluters. Responding to these factors, cost-
minimizing managers will reduce pollution to the point where the marginal cost of
abatement equals the marginal penalty for polluting.
Polluting emissions also reflect managers' technology decisions. Pollutants are
unmarketed  production residuals whose disposal creates environmental damage.
Improved technologies  that waste fewer raw materials therefore have an environmental
advantage that complements their cost advantage. In the OECD countries, innovations
induced by stricter regulation have generated significantly  cleaner technologies that are
available at incremental cost to producers in developing countries. Even in weakly-
regulated economies, many firms have adopted cleaner technologies simply because they
are more profitable. Empirical studies have shown that firms in relatively open
developing economies adopt such technologies  more quickly (Birdsall and Wheeler,
1993; Huq, Martin and Wheeler, 1993).
5. Large multinational firms generally adhere to OECD environmental standards in
their developing-country  operations. Multinational firms operate under close scrutiny
from consumers and environmental NGOs in the OECD economies. While the influence
of these groups is well-known, recent research has suggested that investors also play an
important  role in encouraging clean production. Heavy emissions may signal to investors
that a firm's production techniques are inefficient. Investors also weigh potential
financial losses from regulatory penalties and liability settlements. Several studies have
confirmed that the US and Canadian stock markets react significantly to environmental
9news, generating  gains from good news and losses from bad news in the range of 1-2%.6
According to a recent study of toxic polluters (Konar and Cohen, 1997), firms whose
bad press has the greatest impact on stock prices subsequently  reduce emissions the most.
Similar effects have been identified by recent research on new stock markets in
Argentina,  Chile, Mexico and the Philippines (Dasgupta, Laplante and Mamingi, 1997).
In fact, the responses are much larger than those reported for US and Canadian firms:
Gains average 20% in response to good news and losses range from 4-15% in the wake of
bad news.
Multinationals  have responded to such factors. A recent study of 89 US-based
manufacturing and mining multinationals  with branches in developing countries found
that nearly 60% adhere to a stringent internal standard that reflects OECD norms, while
the others enforce local standards (Dowell, Hart and Yeung, 2000). Controlling for other
factors (e.g. physical assets, capital structure), the study found that firms with uniform
internal standards had an average market value $10.4 billion higher than their
counterparts. To illustrate the implications for local environmental quality, Figure 8
reports results from a careful audit of Indonesian  factories undertaken in 1995 (Afsah and
Vincent, 1997). Almost 70% of domestic plants failed to comply with Indonesian water
pollution regulations, while around 80% of the multinational plants were fully compliant.
4. Implications of the Evidence
A large body of evidence suggests that the predictions of the race-to-the-bottom
model are inaccurate because its assumptions are not realistic. Although pollution
6 See Muoghalu et al. (1990); Lanoie, Laplante (1994); Klassen, McLaughlin (1996); Hamilton (1995); and
Lanoie, Laplante and Roy (1997).
10control costs matter to factory owners and managers, they are generally not a critical
factor in location decisions. In addition, emissions are strongly affected by the increased
availability of clean technologies and the ubiquity of penalties for polluting. Even where
formal regulation is weak or absent, local communities use numerous informal channels
to penalize polluters when they suffer from severe environmental damage. At the
national level, governments display a remarkably consistent  tendency to tighten
regulation as incomes grow. Within countries, regional differences in income and
education  also produce variations in community-based  enforcement of environmental
norns.  At the international  level, scrutiny from customers and investors has led the
majority of firms to standardize  their environmental performance on OECD norms. The
rest subscribe to local norms, which rise over time with income.
In this more realistic view of the world, an environmental "race to the bottom"
appears extremely unlikely. In fact, the converse appears to occur as "the bottom" rises
with economic growth. The poorest societies persistently improve their environmental
quality as investment increases employment  and income. Mutually-reinforcing  feedback
mechanisms at the local, national and international  levels produce increasing pressures
for pollution control as societies develop.
While the evidence suggests that globalization  has been generally compatible with
pollution reduction, several caveats are in order. First, to invert Keynes' maxim, "in the
short run a lot of us might be dead." Under rapid liberalization, a sudden increase of
industrial investment could create  pockets of severe pollution before national
governments or local communities could respond effectively. This could occur even if
"clean" multinationals  expanded locally, since domestic firms would also be attracted by
11increased production and export opportunities. Second, communities' capacity to control
pollution formally or informally depends on the quality of available information about
emissions sources and damages. Some dangerous pollutants can be seen or smelled, but
others cannot be detected without specialized equipment. So, information gaps may well
lead to much higher levels of contamination  than local communities would tolerate if
they were better-informed.
Third, globalization  is almost certain to produce an increase in average pollution
intensity (emissions/output) as developing countries increase their share of world
industrial production. High-income countries have stricter formal and informal
regulation than low-income countries, so production in the latter has higher pollution
intensity (on average -- exceptions have been noted in the previous section). To
illustrate,  Figure 9 summarizes a recent econometric result from a cross-country analysis
of organic water pollution: Relative to the highest-income countries, the poorest
countries have an approximately tenfold differential in pollution intensity. The biggest
improvements  come relatively early in the growth process, as countries grow from
around $500 per capita to $3,000 per capita. After that, the marginal improvements level
off considerably (Mani and Wheeler, 1998).
The air monitoring data in Figures 2-5 reveal the consequences of differential
pollution intensity. In the late 1990's,  Cubatao's PM-10 concentration was around 80
while PM-  10 concentrations in most US cities were below 30. After a decade of decline,
China's urban SPM readings were still around 300 in 1995 -- far higher than readings in
OECD cities. This differential may have created the mistaken view that globalization is
creating a "race to the bottom," even though air quality seems to be improving in
12countries  at all income  levels. If current  trends  continue,  the "bottom"  will continue  to
rise and  international  average  pollution  intensities  will  begin  to fall at some  point  in the
future. The critical  point  for the globalization  debate  is that  cities  in developing  countries
have  actually  improved  their environmental  quality  during  a period  of rapid  liberalization
and industrial  growth.
7. Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
A large  body  of evidence  suggests  that there  will be no environmental  "race  to the
bottom"  for two main  reasons. First,  communities  in developing  countries  are neither
passive  agents  nor focused  exclusively  on material  gain. Empowered  with good
information  about  the benefits  and costs  of environmental  protection,  they  will act  to
protect  their  own  interests. As  their income  and  education  levels  improve,  they  will
control  pollution  more  strictly. Second,  consumers  and  investors  assign  significant  value
to environmental  performance  and,  if they  are well-informed,  their market  decisions  will
provide  powerful  incentives  to reduce  pollution. On both  counts,  the most  plausible
long-run  forecast  is for rising,  not falling,  environmental  quality  in both high-  and  low-
income  economies.  A significant  gap may  remain,  but pollution  damage  should  decline
significantly  in poor countries  as they  develop.
While  this  news  is good  for the global  commons  in the long run, adjustment  to a
cleaner  world  is not likely  to be smooth. Countries  whose  economic  policies  induce  a
rapid  expansion  of income  and employment  may also  experience  severe  environmental
damage  unless  direct  measures  are taken  to accelerate  regulation's  positive  long-run
response  to income  growth. On the macro-policy  front,  the persistence  of a regulatory
gap between  rich and poor  countries  may  lead  to continuing  controversy  over trade  policy
13and international assistance strategy. OECD interest groups that support protectionist
measures for other reasons may continue to invoke the race-to-the-bottom model, relying
on a common misperception that the regulatory gap automatically implies a race to the
bottom. Despite clear evidence to the contrary, they may continue to argue that a race to
the bottom can only be avoided through enforcement of uniform environmental standards
in all countries. Lacking any direct means of creating such a regime, they may argue for
trade restrictions and aid cutbacks until poor countries close the gap. The available
evidence suggests that such measures will retard, not advance, the day when the gap
actually disappears.
In summary, the basic assumptions of the race-to-the-bottom  model are contradicted
by a large body of empirical research. Its flaws invalidate its main conclusion (the
inevitability of the race to the bottom) and its main policy prescription (uniform
standards, enforced by any means necessary). Abandoning this theory, however, does not
imply that poor countries must resign themselves to bad environmental quality for an
extended period. Several recent benefit-cost  analyses have made a persuasive case for
stricter pollution control, even in very low-income economies. In China, for example, a
recent study has shown that the economic returns to pollution abatement would justify
significant  tightening of regulation (Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler, 1997). Similar
studies in Indonesia and Brazil have produced similar conclusions.'
How can environmental quality improvement  be accelerated in the era of
globalization? Recent international  experience has identified four keys to rapid progress:
1. Sustained support for programs that provide public. easily-accessible information
about polluters. pollution damages. local environmental quality and the cost of pollution
14abatement. Such programs significantly  improve the ability of local communities  to
protect themselves, national regulators to enforce decent environmental standards, and
market agents to reward clean firms and punish heavy polluters. International institutions
such as the World Bank have begun supporting this idea in collaborative programs with
environmental  agencies in Indonesia, Philippines, China, Thailand, Vietnam, Mexico,
Colombia, Brazil and elsewhere. 8
2.  Sustained support for development  of stronger regulatorv institutions and cost-
effective measures to reduce pollution. Sustained support is critical, because institutional
development  takes time. Although private sector clean-production initiatives can play a
valuable  role, only public sector institutions can protect society's general interest in a
cleaner environment.
3.  Reiection of trade and aid sanctions as levers to force closure of the reaulatorv
gap between low- and high-income countries. First, such sanctions are unjust because
they fail to discriminate between clean and dirty firms in the affected countries.
Numerous studies have shown that factories with world-class standards are operating
even in the poorest countries (Huq and Wheeler, 1992; Hartman, Huq and Wheeler, 1997;
Afsah and Vincent, 1997; Wheeler, 1999). Second, such blunt instruments will
inevitably penalize workers in poor countries by reducing opportunities for jobs and
higher wages. Finally, they won't work anyway. As previous sections have noted, poor
countries have weaker regulation and higher pollution intensity for a host of reasons.
7  See  Von Amsberg  (1997)  on Brazil  and  Calkins  (1993)  on Indonesia.
a For more  information  about  these  programs,  see the World  Bank's  "New  Ideas in Pollution  Regulation"
Website  at http://www.worldbank.org/nipr.
15Governments  of low-income countries could not deliver on promises of OECD-level
regulation,  even if they were willing to make them.
4. Willingness by the World Bank. the IMF and other institutions to take explicit
account of environmental risks in the design and implementation of adjustment
operations and other economic reform programs. Rapid structural change could inflict
severe pollution damage on some localities unless public environmental information and
regulation keep pace with changing conditions. Willingness to recognize and compensate
for this risk with targeted programs will greatly strengthen the credibility of international
institutions that support continued economic liberalization  in the name of sustainable
development.
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23Figure 9:  Industrial  Pollution Intensity and Economic Development
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